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We investigate the quantum signature scheme proposed by Zeng and Keitel [Phys. Rev. A 65,
042312 (2002)]. It uses Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states and the availability of a trusted
arbitrator. However, in our opinion the protocol is not clearly operationally defined and several
steps are ambiguous. Moreover, we argue that the security statements claimed by the authors are
incorrect.
PACS numbers:
Digital signature schemes provide message authentica-
tion which enables third parties to settle disputes about
the authenticity of messages. In Ref. [1] Zeng and Kei-
tel proposed a quantum signature scheme that requires
the availability of a trusted arbitrator as part of the sig-
nature initialization and verification algorithms. In our
opinion, the protocol is not well operationally defined, its
presentation is misleading, and several steps are ambigu-
ous. Moreover, we believe that the security statements
claimed by the authors are incorrect. We first list the
main points of our criticism and then provide more de-
tails.
The scheme proposed in Ref. [1] has as its goal to sign
a quantum state |P 〉. From the paper, however, it is not
clear whether the sender (Alice), the receiver (Bob), or
the arbitrator, need to know the identity of the quantum
state |P 〉 to be signed, or whether they have access to
a restricted number of copies of an unknown state |P 〉.
One of the main motivations for the work presented in
Ref. [1] is that “classical signature schemes are difficult
to assign to messages in qubit format”. Then, one might
be tempted to assume that none of the parties involved
in the communication has a classical description of the
state |P 〉. However, it is well known that signing un-
known quantum messages is not possible [2]. One can
then consider that all the parties know the state |P 〉.
This assumption renders the quantum signature scheme
proposed in Ref. [1] to one intended to sign classical data
using quantum resources. However, in this scenario it is
unclear what are the real advantages of this protocol, if
any, with respect to unconditionally secure classical sig-
nature schemes (see, e.g., Ref. [3] and references therein).
Finally, one can assume the natural scenario where Bob
(or even the arbitrator) do not know the state |P 〉. How-
ever, as we will show below, the signature scheme pro-
posed in Ref. [1] is insecure in this last case [4].
In several crucial points of the protocol a step of state
comparison is required . Especially, if Bob does not know
the state |P 〉 to be signed, he would have to compare two
unknown states. The authors of Ref. [1] did not clarify
in their manuscript how to perform these quantum state
comparison steps, and they treat them as determinis-
tic and error-free processes. However, it is evident from
the no-cloning theorem [5] to be impossible to do uni-
versal quantum state comparison in a deterministic way
and without disturbing the original states. For a quan-
titative analysis of this scenario see Ref. [6], where the
optimal comparison test and its success probability have
been recently obtained.
Let us now discuss our criticism in more detail. We
start with a brief description of the protocol. The scheme
includes three phases [1]: an initial phase, a signing
phase, and a verification phase. In the first one, Alice,
Bob, and the arbitrator distribute two secret keys, Ka
(Alice-arbitrator) and Kb (Bob-arbitrator). These two
secret keys might consist of quantum states or of classi-
cal data. Next, they create and distribute GHZ states.
The distribution of GHZ states has to be repeated for ev-
ery single communication: the “algorithm relies crucially
on the entanglement of the three involved communica-
tors”. In this Comment we will consider that this initial
phase can be completed in a safe manner, although the
authors of Ref. [1] do not present any specific protocol to
verify the correct execution of entanglement distribution.
The signing phase can be used to sign pure n-qubit
messages of the form |P 〉 = ⊗ni=1(αi|0〉 + βi|1〉). The
signature of |P 〉, denoted as |S〉, is defined as a quantum
encryption of some classical data Ma and a quantum
state |R〉. In order to encrypt this information Ref. [1]
proposes to use the “approach known as ‘quantum state
operation’”. It remains unclear what the authors mean
with “quantum state operation”, but a quantum one-
time-pad scheme might be used for this purpose [7]. More
important, in this step it is not clearly defined how the
crucial quantum state |R〉 is generated by Alice. First, it
seems that Alice uses Ka to select a set of “measurement
operators” MKa . If Ka denotes a quantum state |Ka〉,
then MKa must contain |Ka〉 as an eigenvector. Note,
however, that in this scenario it remains unclear how Al-
ice can obtain MKa from |Ka〉 if she does not have a
classical description of the quantum state |Ka〉. If Ka
is a classical key then MKa can represent any measure-
2ment operator within a given set indexed by Ka. Next,
the sentence “Alice is required to measure the informa-
tion string of qubits |P 〉 using MKa and obtains |R〉”
seems to indicate that |R〉 arises from a measurement
on |P 〉, i.e., MKa is an observable. Note, however, that
in this case the protocol can only work probabilistically.
After receiving an advance copy of this manuscript, the
authors of Ref. [1] emphasized that MKa denotes a uni-
tary transformation [8]. Therefore, from now on we will
consider that |R〉 =MKa |P 〉 with MKa unitary.
The verification algorithm requires the arbitrator to
obtain a parameter γ arising from a forgery test. In order
to do that, he needs to generate two quantum states,
|R〉 and |R′〉, that need to be compared (Step 2 in the
verification phase). If |R〉 and |R′〉 are different, then
γ = 0 and |P 〉 has to be rejected. Otherwise γ = 1 and
Bob needs to perform a second verification test. Here,
again, it is not clearly stated how does the arbitrator
obtain these two states |R〉 and |R′〉 from Mb, |S〉, and
|P 〉 sent by Bob. More important, as pointed out above,
the authors of Ref. [1] do not explain how the quantum
state comparison test between |R〉 and |R′〉 is performed.
Once the first forgery test introduced above concludes,
the arbitrator needs to obtain a parameterMt. The pro-
cedure to generateMt is a bit misleading . Ref. [1] claims
that “the arbitrator measures or evaluates the states of
the particles in his string of GHZ states”. Again, here
it is not clear the meaning of “evaluates”. Once Mt is
obtained, whatever the process involved, the arbitrator
prepares a quantum state ytb containing part of the in-
formation obtained in the previous steps of the protocol
and he sends it to Bob.
Depending on the contents of ytb, Bob needs to decide
whether the message originates from Alice or not. This
constitutes the last step of the verification phase. Now
Bob has to compare the quantum state |P 〉 with a state
|P ′〉. “If |P ′〉 = |P 〉, the signature is completely correct
and Bob accepts |P 〉, otherwise, he rejects it”. Again, at
this crucial point we find the problem of how to obtain
the quantum states |P 〉 and |P ′〉 from ytb, and how to
realize the quantum state comparison test.
Next, we show that the protocol presented in Ref. [1]
cannot lead to a secure signature scheme if Bob and the
arbitrator do not know the state |P 〉. To simplify our
notation, we shall mainly consider one-qubit messages,
i.e., |P 〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉.
To obtain the parameter Ma, Alice performs a Bell
measurement on a copy of the state |P 〉 and her particle
of the GHZ state. Let us assume, for instance, that Ma
corresponds to the state |Ψ−
12
〉a (see Eq. (8) in Ref. [1]),
which will always occur with probability 1/4, and that
|R〉 has been obtained as |R〉 = MKa|P 〉, with MKa
denoting a unitary transformation. The correlations of
the GHZ state impose, in this case, that the state shared
by Bob and the arbitrator is |ϕ〉 = α|00〉 − β|11〉.
The verification phase begins once Bob receives |P 〉
and |S〉 from Alice. Here Bob measures his particle of |ϕ〉
in the x direction. The result is recorded in the parameter
Mb. The state |ϕ〉 = α|00〉 − β|11〉 can be written as
|ϕ〉 = 1/√2(| + x〉σZ |P 〉 + | − x〉|P 〉), where | ± x〉 =
1/
√
2(|0〉 ± |1〉), and σZ is the Pauli matrix (σZ |0〉 =
|0〉 and σZ |1〉 = −|1〉). Both possible results, {| ± x〉},
have equal a priori probability 1/2. Let us consider, for
instance, that Mb = |+ x〉. The state of the arbitrator’s
particle is then reduced to σZ |P 〉.
Next, Bob sends yb = Kb(Mb, |S〉, |P 〉) to the arbitra-
tor. With this information the arbitrator performs his
forgery test. Now, in order to obtain |R〉 and |R′〉, we
consider two possible alternatives. On the one hand, to
evaluate if the message received by Bob is authentic, it
seems that |R〉 and |R′〉 should depend on |P 〉 and |S〉.
That is, |R〉 originates from |P 〉 as |R〉 = MKa |P 〉, and
|R′〉 from |S〉 (or vice versa). On the other hand, the au-
thors of Ref. [1]) assert that the decryption of |S〉 “gives
rise to |R′〉 via the correlations of the GHZ state”. One
might then also think that |R′〉 (or |R〉) arises from the
GHZ particle of the arbitrator, and |R〉 (or |R′〉) from
|S〉 or |P 〉. Note that by using the correlationsMa (con-
tained in |S〉), and Mb the arbitrator can find that his
particle is in the state σZ |P 〉. Then he could recover |P 〉
applying σZ (σ
2
Z = I). More important, once the arbitra-
tor obtains |R〉 and |R′〉, whatever the process involved,
he needs to compare these two unknown quantum states
to decide whether they are equal or not. Unfortunately,
it is known that it is impossible to conclusively identify
two pure unknown states as being identical [6]. Never-
theless, one can perform a measurement that examines
whether the systems are not the same [6]. Let q denote
the average success probability of identifying two pure
unknown states as different. With this comparison pro-
cedure no valid messages will produce γ = 0, but we find
that a forged message will be accepted with probability
1 − q. For one-qubit messages we have that q = 1/4
[6]. Here we consider that |R〉 and |R′〉 are selected at
random within the set of all pure states. For n-qubit
messages the value of q depends onMKa . Ref. [1] seems
to consider MKa =
⊗n
i=1MiKi
a
, with Mi
Ki
a
unitary for
all i. |P 〉|S〉 = ⊗ni=1 |pi〉|si〉, Now a potential adversary
could follow, for instance, an strategy that do not mod-
ify all the n qubits contained in |P 〉, but only a small
fraction m of them. This is sufficient to achieve a dra-
matic decrease of the quantum fidelity [9] of the result-
ing quantum state with respect to the original message
|P 〉. In the worse-case-scenario (m = 1) the arbitrator
will accept a forged message with probability 3/4. One
can improve the ability of detecting forged messages by
using a general unitary transformation MKa . Unfortu-
nately, even for this scenario the value of q is relative
low: q = 1/2 (1 − 2−n) [6]. As a consequence, we find
that a possible attacker (which includes as well a poten-
tial dishonest Bob) could modify Alice’s messages such
that the acceptance parameter γ satisfies γ = 1 with non
negligible probability. Moreover, note that so far we al-
ways assumed that |R〉 and |R′〉 are pure states. A better
security analysis against an adversary that sends mixed
states, would also be necessary here.
3From now on, we shall presume that Bob is honest
and we evaluate his forgery test. For simplicity, we will
consider that the comparison process described above can
be accomplished without disturbing the original states.
After calculating γ, the arbitrator needs to obtain the
parameter Mt. “Note that Mt may be |+ x〉 or | − x〉”.
It seems, therefore, that to obtain Mt ∈ {| ± x〉} the
authors of Ref. [1] require that the arbitrator measures
his particle of the GHZ state in the x direction. Further-
more, in Ref. [1] it is specifically mentioned that “the
arbitrator may choose an appropriate sequence of mea-
surement operators to measure his GHZ particle”. Once
this measurement is performed, the arbitrator sends Bob
the state ytb = Kb(Ma,Mb,Mt, γ, |S〉).
Bob does not know Alice’s secret key Ka. This means
that from ytb he cannot obtain the message |P 〉 anymore.
Note that |P 〉 cannot be calculated from Ma, Mb, and
Mt alone: the parameters Ma and Mb are completely
independent of |P 〉, whereas Mt = | ± x〉 only means
that |P 〉 is not orthogonal to | ∓ x〉 (assuming that the
arbitrator’s particle was σZ |P 〉). To avoid this problem
in the protocol, let us assume for the moment that ytb also
includes the message |P 〉, or that Bob can have access to
a copy of the state |P 〉 somehow.
Now the last step of the verification phase takes place.
Here Bob has to compare |P 〉 with a state |P ′〉. “If
|P ′〉 = |P 〉, the signature is completely correct and Bob
accepts |P 〉, otherwise, he rejects it”. In order to obtain
|P ′〉 Bob must use the parameters Ma, Mb and Mt.
Note that “|P ′〉 is obtained from a calculation and not
a physical measurement, because Bob’s particle has al-
ready been measured in the first step of the verification
phase”. But, as pointed out above, from Ma, Mb, and
Mt, Bob might obtain a |P ′〉 different from |P 〉 even for
valid messages. Note that the result of a measurement
(Mt) on a quantum state (σZ |P 〉) does not completely
identify the original state. In fact, one may even as-
sume that the arbitrator does not measure his particle
of the GHZ state. Instead, he sends it to Bob in place
of the parameter Mt. Unfortunately, we end up again
with the problem of comparing two unknown quantum
states. This comparison test can produce the acceptance
of forged messages with non negligible probability.
So far we have shown that the quantum signature
scheme proposed in Ref. [1] is unable to guarantee se-
curity against a dishonest Bob or a possible attacker in
the natural scenario where |P 〉 is only known to the signer
Alice. Moreover, we have shown that, even in the absence
of dishonest parties, this scheme, as originally proposed,
does not allow Bob to recover the message |P 〉 sent by
Alice. After having access to this manuscript, Zeng and
Keitel acknowledged that in their work they need to “rea-
sonably assume that Alice, Bob, and the arbitrator know
the message |P 〉” beforehand [8]. Unfortunately, this cru-
cial point for their scheme is not mentioned at all in their
original manuscript, and it constitutes a severe limitation
for the possible applicability of this protocol in a practical
communication scenario. With this strong assumption,
now one could modify the protocol in Ref. [1] and sub-
stitute the parameter Mt by the original GHZ particle
of the arbitrator such that Bob can obtain |P ′〉 (from
his knowledge of Ma and Mb) and compare it with the
known |P 〉. Moreover, in the signing phase Alice would
not need to send Bob the quantum state |P 〉 anymore,
but only its signature |S〉. However, it seems to us that
this scheme would be rather inefficient and expensive in
terms of the quantum resources needed to perform this
particular task. In the literature there are already un-
conditionally secure classical signature schemes to sign
classical information, with or without arbitrator, that
moreover consider the natural scenario where the mes-
sage to be signed does not need to be publicly known
beforehand [3]. In fact, if we assume the availability of
a trusted arbitrator, Alice and Bob could as well use
classical message authentication codes [10] to sign their
messages [11]. Therefore, we believe that in this case it
would be necessary that the authors of Ref. [1] clarify
the relevance of their scheme in a practical communica-
tion scenario together with its real advantages, if any,
with respect to unconditionally secure classical signature
protocols.
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